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Two experiments investigate the scope of imitation by testing whether 36-month-olds 
can learn to produce a categorization strategy through observation. After witnessing 
an adult sort a set of objects by a visible property (their color, Experiment 1) or a 
non-visible property (the particular sounds produced when the objects were shaken, 
Experiment 2), children showed significantly more sorting by those dimensions 
relative to children in control groups, including a control in which children saw the 
sorted endstate but not the intentional sorting demonstration. The results show that 
36-month-olds can do more than imitate the literal behaviors they see; they also 
abstract and imitate rules that they see another person use. 
 
 
Imitation is an early developing ability that 
allows children to acquire skills and behaviors 
from other people in their culture. Aspects of 
imitation may be specific to humans; indeed, 
imitation has been implicated in the development 
of complex social-cognitive processes such as 
theory of mind (e.g. Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; 
Meltzoff, 2007), and has been proposed as a 
fundamental mechanism for transmitting culture  
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from one generation to the next (e.g., Boyd & 
Richerson, 1996; Meltzoff, Kuhl, Movellan, & 
Sejnowski, in press; Tomasello, 1999). In order to 
understand how imitation contributes to these 
achievements, an important question concerns the 
type of information that can be imitated. 
The overarching goal of this paper is to extend 
the typical studies of imitation, which have largely 
examined imitation of concrete actions (means) 
and outcomes (ends). We test imitation at a more 
abstract level—whether children can learn a 
cognitive strategy or rule from observing another’s 
behaviors. We test whether watching an adult sort 
several objects along a particular dimension (e.g., 
their non-obvious sound-making properties) will 
lead children to sort objects along the same 
dimension.  
Past research has established that children can 
quickly and efficiently learn to perform simple 
behaviors from watching others. This includes 
imitating the physical outcomes that people 
produce using objects. Experiments with infants 
and toddlers show imitation of a wide range of 
outcomes, including opening containers, activating 
lights or sounds, and using simple tools (e.g. 
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Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002; Meltzoff, 
1988, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Want & Harris, 2001). 
Toddlers can also infer what the intended outcome 
of a model’s behavior is even if they do not see the 
model achieve the goal. In an experiment by 
Meltzoff (1995), 18-month-olds saw an adult 
attempt to complete a variety of tasks, but they 
never saw him succeed. When given their turn at 
solving the problem, the children demonstrated 
their understanding of the model’s underlying 
goals or intentions by performing the act that 
would achieve the inferred goal rather than 
replicating the same unsuccessful actions used by 
the adult. 
Children can also copy the exact means or 
literal actions that others use (e.g. Barr, Dowden, 
& Hayne, 1996; Bauer, 1992; Flynn & Whiten, 
2008; Meltzoff, 1988; Nagell, Olguin, & 
Tomasello, 1993; Nielsen, 2006; Tennie, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2006). In one experiment, a group of 
14-month-olds saw an adult act in distinct and 
novel ways on objects to produce outcomes. For 
example, an adult bent and touched a light panel 
with his head and the light turned on (Meltzoff, 
1988). When given the object for the first time 
after a week delay, 67% of the children produced 
this novel act. In contrast, none of the children in a 
control group who saw the adult manipulate the 
object but not produce the target act did so. 
Children are highly attuned to the specific actions 
others produce, and there are circumstances in 
which they over-imitate, i.e. to reproduce actions 
that are unnecessary or even counterproductive for 
completing an outcome (Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, 
Flynn & Horner, 2007; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, 
Teixidor, & Bard, 1996).  
A growing body of research is focused on the 
conditions that govern imitation, with findings 
showing that children’s imitation is regulated by 
the overall goal of the demonstration and their 
understanding of how purposeful, effective, and 
contextually appropriate the acts are (Bekkering, 
Wöhlschlager, & Gattis, 2000; Brugger, Lariviere, 
Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; Carpenter, Akhtar, & 
Tomasello, 1998; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 
2005; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; Flynn, 2008; 
Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Gleissner, 
Bekkering, & Meltzoff, 2000; Nielsen, 2006; 
Repacholi & Meltzoff, 2007; Want & Harris, 
2001; Williamson & Markman, 2006; Williamson, 
Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008).  
In adults, another important part of imitation is 
duplicating the strategy, organization, or rules that 
another person uses when tackling a task. For 
example, a graduate student may attend a scientific 
talk by an experienced speaker and use that talk as 
a guide or template when constructing one they 
later give themselves. The student would not copy 
the exact words or content from the model’s 
presentation, but they might decide to apply the 
model’s organizational structure. This type of 
social learning is not tied to concrete outcomes of 
manipulating an object, as is the case, for example, 
when learning about a tool’s function (e.g. Casler 
& Kelemen, 2005, 2007). Instead, this scenario 
involves learning an abstract cognitive strategy 
that could be applied across a very broad set of 
situations and used when faced with a new 
problem. Rule imitation adds an important 
component to investigations of how cultural 
knowledge is transmitted and influences individual 
behavior (e.g., Smith, Kalish, Griffiths, & 
Lewandowsky, 2008). 
There is evidence that children and other 
primates can imitate the organization of a series of 
behaviors (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Subiaul, 
Cantlon, Holloway, & Terrace, 2004; Subiaul, 
Lurie, Romansky, Klein, Holmes & Terrace, 2007; 
Subiaul, Romansky, Cantlon, Klein & Terrace, 
2007; Whiten, Flynn, Brown, & Lee, 2006). For 
example, children are more likely to remember 
and reproduce the actions in a series that are 
necessary (versus unnecessary) for producing 
meaningful outcomes (e.g. Barr & Hayne, 1996; 
Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Mandler, 1989). Young 
children have also been shown to imitate another’s 
action organization in a different way (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2008; Whiten et al., 2006). In Flynn and 
Whiten’s experiment, for example, 3- and 5-year-
olds saw a model open a locked puzzle box either 
by first assembling and then manipulating each of 
a number of keys, or assembling and manipulating 
each of the keys in turn. Even though both 
approaches would yield the same outcome of 
unlocking the box, the children were more likely 
to use the approach they saw demonstrated (even 
with a novel key) rather than the other approach.  
Further, Subiaul and colleagues (2004, 2007a, 
2007b) investigated whether rhesus macaque 
monkeys, typically developing children, and 
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individuals with autism can imitate an arbitrary 
sequence of actions (pressing pictures in a 
particular order) (Subiaul et al., 2004; Subiaul, 
Lurie, et al., 2007; Subiaul, Romansky, et al., 
2007). In this work, several pictures appear 
simultaneously on a touch-screen. When the 
pictures are touched in a specific sequence (e.g., A 
 B  C  D), monkeys receive a reward of a 
food pellet and humans see an entertaining video 
clip. When a mistake is made (e.g., A  D), the 
trial ends and no reinforcement is provided. The 
spatial configuration of the pictures on the touch-
screen changes on each trial, so that the sequence 
of pictures, rather than specific motor movements, 
must be learned. Participants in these studies 
watched a model activate the correct sequence of 
pictures to obtain a reward. Later, the participants 
were given the opportunity to play the game 
themselves. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds who 
watched the model were faster to implement the 
observed sequence than those who had not seen 
the demonstration. 
We here investigate a different kind of abstract 
imitation in young children, the ability of 36-
month-olds to extract a categorization rule from 
observing the behavior of a model. We tested 
whether children who watch an adult intentionally 
sort a group of objects into two categories along a 
particular dimension (e.g., the invisible sound-
making properties of the object) would later sort 
along that dimension themselves. To correctly 
reproduce a sorting strategy, children would have 
to identify the dimension the model was using for 
categorizing and then re-enact it in their own 
sorting behavior. Such behavior would be 
particularly striking if the dimension used by the 
adult was different from the one the children 
spontaneously use.  
Sorting strategies are an interesting case 
because the relevant groupings can be applied 
across many materials and situations and can lead 
to further learning. For example, grouping 
strawberries by color in order to predict their 
ripeness and flavor could also be applied to other 
types of fruit across seasons; and grouping objects 
by their invisible properties (such as sound) is an 
important principle for establishing natural kinds 
in biology and other sciences. If 3-year-olds can 
acquire such categorization strategies by watching 
others employ them, it suggests a powerful, non-
verbal mechanism by which generalizable rules or 
strategies can be learned. 
In Experiment 1, we examined whether 36-
month-old children would sort a series of objects 
by color rather than by shape after watching a 
model demonstrate a color sorting strategy. In 
Experiment 2, we investigated whether children 
would sort objects by a non-obvious dimension 
(the sound each object made) after watching a 
model demonstrate that sorting strategy. Several 
alternative mechanisms, such as stimulus 
enhancement or the matching of endstates 
(sometimes called emulation, e.g. Want & Harris, 
2002), could lead to increased sorting along a 
particular dimension. To rule out these lower-
order explanations we also included relevant 
control groups, thus isolating the importance of 
observing a model’s intentional sorting behavior. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: VISIBLE PROPERTIES 
 
Past research has shown that young children 
preferentially sort by shape (e.g. Brian & 
Goodenough, 1929; Kagan & Lemkin, 1961; 
Melkman, Koriat, & Pardo, 1976; Suchman & 
Trabasso, 1966). Experiment 1 tests whether 
children who see an adult intentionally sort an 
array of objects (containing two shapes and two 
colors) into two groups based on their color would 
subsequently adopt the same sorting strategy. For 
example, one set of eight objects included two 
black and two white hats and two black and two 
white spoons. Children could choose to group the 
objects by color, by shape, or to place them 
randomly. To assess the importance of the 
intentional demonstration, we also measured the 
sorting behaviors of children in three control 
groups. The Baseline group established children’s 
rate of color sorting when the adult did not act on 
the objects. The Presort group addressed the 
possibility that seeing the outcome of the sorting 
demonstration—namely, the objects sorted by 
color—would lead children to sort by color. 
Finally, the Presort + Manipulation group was 
included to control for the possibility that 
increased attention to the objects-in-categories (as 
opposed to witnessing the adult’s sorting behavior) 
might lead children to sort by color. If children, 
like adults, can learn a rule from another person’s 
intentional intervention, they should be more 
likely to sort the objects by color after witnessing 
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that sorting behavior than are children in the 
control groups 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Eighty 36-month-old children 
(40 males), whose ages ranged from 2;11 to 3;1 
(years; months), were recruited through the 
University of Washington’s participant list. The 
racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 86% 
white, 1% Asian, 8% mixed race, and 5% 
other/unknown, with 4% self-reporting as being of 
Hispanic ethnicity. Direct measures of 
socioeconomic status were not obtained, but the 
sample was generally middle- to upper-middle 
class according to previous studies using the same 
participant pool. Four additional children’s data 
were excluded due to experimenter error. 
Materials. We used two sets of eight objects, 
each containing equal numbers of objects of two 
shapes and two colors. One set consisted of two 
white and two black hats (5.5 x 5 x 2 cm) and two 
white and two black spoons (10.5 x 2.5 x 1cm). 
The second set included two green and two pink 
dice (2.5 x 2.5 x 2.5 cm) and two green and two 
pink crayon-erasers (7 cm x 1.5 cm diameter). The 
objects were sorted into a two-bowled tray (23.5 x 
5 x 4.5 cm), hereafter referred to as “bowls,” 
(Figure 1, left panel).  
Procedure. Children were tested individually 
in a university laboratory room and their behavior 
was digitally recorded for subsequent analysis. 
Each child was randomly assigned to one of four 
independent groups, each consisting of a 
demonstration phase and a response period.  
 
Demonstration Phase. 
Sorting. The experimenter placed one of the 
sets of eight objects in a randomly intermixed heap 
on the table (within approximately a circle of 10 
cm radius). The bowls were placed on the table 
slightly beyond the heap from the children. The 
experimenter drew the children’s attention (e.g. 
“It’s my turn first”), and then, one at a time, 
picked up and placed each object of one color into 
one bowl, and then placed each of the objects of 
the other color into the other bowl. 
Baseline control. Children in this control 
group saw no demonstration; the session began 
with the response period described below. This 
provided a baseline assessment of the degree to 
which children spontaneously sorted by shape or 
color without observing a demonstration. 
Presort control. The experimenter presented 
children with the eight objects from a particular 
set, as in the Sorting group. However, the objects 
were presented inside the bowls, already sorted by 
color (e.g., the green dice and crayons in one 
bowl; the pink dice and crayons in the other). The 
experimenter drew the children’s attention to the 
objects by moving her hand in front of the bowls 
and saying, for example, “See, we are going to 
play with these.” This condition controlled for the 
possibility that children would sort the objects into 
two groups based merely on seeing the outcome of 
the sorting process – the two-category 
configuration. 
Presort + Manipulation control. As in the 
previous control group, the experimenter in this 
condition presented children with the eight objects  
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already sorted in the two bowls by color. 
However, this control group was even more 
rigorous inasmuch as the experimenter also 
manipulated the objects. She explained, “It’s my 
turn first,” and proceeded to lift and return each 
object one at a time from the bowl on the child’s 
right, and then did the same for each object in the 
left-hand bowl. This controls for the possibility 
that children will sort the objects into groups based 
on seeing the endstate configuration plus a person 
actively handling the objects in each of the bowls.  
Response Period. The response period for all 
groups was identical. The experimenter placed the 
objects in a mixed pile on the table in front of the 
children (either emptying them out of the bowls in 
the Sorting, Presort control, and Presort + 
Manipulation control groups, or simply placing 
them there in the case of the Baseline control 
group). The bowls were placed slightly farther 
back on the table, but still within reaching distance 
for the children. The children were then given the 
opportunity to place all of the objects into the 
bowls (e.g., “Now it’s your turn to play with 
these.”). If they did not sort the objects into the 
bowls exhaustively by color (all four of one color 
in one bowl and all four of the other color in the 
other bowl), they were given a second opportunity 
to do so. In this case, the experimenter removed all 
of the objects from the bowls, placed the eight 
objects into a mixed pile on the table, offered a 
second, neutral prompt (“You can have another 
turn”), and gave the child the opportunity to place 
the objects into the bowls. The objects of Set A 
were then removed.  
Next, children were given a second set of 
objects (Set B) to test generalization. These eight 
objects were placed in a mixed pile on the table. 
No demonstration was shown. This provided a test 
of whether children in the Sorting group would 
transfer the color sorting strategy from one array 
of objects to a novel set. As with Set A, the 
children were given up to two opportunities to 
place the objects of Set B into the bowls by color. 
The order in which the set of objects was 
presented was counterbalanced across the 
experimental groups, as was the color placed in 
the left or right bowl during the demonstration 
phase. 
Dependent Measures and Scoring. Research 
assistants, blind to the experimental group, scored 
the children’s sorting behaviors from video. In 
order to be credited with a sort, the child had to 
place all four objects of one dimension (shape or 
color) into one bowl and all of the other objects 
into the opposite bowl. The scorers recorded 
whether children reached this criterion, and if so, 
by which dimension (shape or color). Two 
dependent measures were calculated, a 
preferential-sort score and a color-sort score. 
Preferential-sort score. Children were given 
up to two chances to place the objects of Set A and 
up to two chances to place the objects of Set B 
into the bowls. The preferential-sort score 
measures whether a child’s first sort of the objects 
was by shape or color. If the child’s first sort for a 
set of objects was by color, it was scored as +1; if 
it was by shape, it was scored as -1. If the child 
failed to sort a set of objects by color or shape he 
received a score of 0. The scores from each of the 
two sets of objects were then summed, resulting in 
a score that ranged from -2 (two shape sorts) to +2 
(two color sorts) for each child. 
Color-sort score. The color-sort score is a 
measure of whether the children ever sorted a set 
of objects according to color. For each set, the 
scorer made a yes/no judgment of whether the 
child placed all of the objects of one color in one 
bowl and all of the objects of the other color in the 
second bowl, either on the first or second attempt 
(when given) with each set of objects. Each “yes” 
judgment was scored as a 1 and each “no” as a 0, 
resulting in a score for each participant ranging 
from 0 (neither set sorted by color) to 2 (both sets 
sorted by color). 
Scoring agreement was assessed by re-coding 
a randomly-chosen 25% of the data by a scorer 
who was blind to the experimental group and to 
the hypotheses of the study. The agreement was 
100%. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Preliminary analyses of the preferential-sort 
scores show that children readily sorted the objects 
during the response period according to either the 
color or shape dimension: 71 of the 80 children 
(89%) sorted at least one of the sets of objects 
either by color or by shape. The mean number of 
sets sorted (out of 2) ranged between 1.40 - 1.50 
(SD = .68 -.76) for all four experimental groups, 
with no significant difference among groups, F (3, 
76) = .10, p = .96, hp2 = .00. Thus, children were 
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equally likely to sort the objects along one of the 
two dimensions regardless of group. 
Even though the children in all groups were 
equally likely to engage in a sorting behavior, 
Figure 2 shows that the particular dimension on 
which they sorted varied as a function of 
experimental group. A one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) of the preferential-sort scores 
showed that children in the Sorting group were 
more likely to sort by color on their first sort (M = 
.90, SD = 1.1) than were children in each of the 
three control groups (Baseline M = -.50, SD = 1.0; 
Presort M = -.30, SD = 1.4; Presort + Manipulation 
M = 0, SD = 1.4), F (3, 76) = 4.97, p = .003, hp2 = 
.16. Follow-up comparisons using the Student-
Newman-Keuls (SNK) method showed that 
children in the Sorting group were significantly (p 
< .05) more likely to sort by color than were 
children in each of the controls, and that the 
control groups did not significantly differ from 
one another. Additionally, only in the Sorting 
group was the mean preferential-sort score 
significantly above 0, t(19) = 3.60, p = .002, 
Cohen’s d = .80, indicating that only after 
observing the model sort by color were the 
children more likely to initially sort objects by 
color than by shape. In contrast, the initial sorts of 
the children in the Baseline control group were 
significantly below 0, indicating that their first 
sorts were more likely to be by shape than by 
color, t(19) = 2.24, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .50. The 
first sorts of the other two control groups (Presort 
and Presort + Manipulation controls) were at 
chance levels. 
     The distribution of the raw preferential-sort 
scores documents the strength of this effect. As 
shown in Table 1, 65% of the children (13 of 20) 
in the Sorting group had scores of +1 or +2, 
indicating preferential sorting by color rather than 
by shape. In contrast, only 25% of the children (15 
of 60) across all of the control groups combined 
had scores of +1 or +2, p < .01 Fisher’s exact test, 
Cramer’s V = .36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This pattern of results is the same when 
considering the color-sort scores. As shown in 
Figure 3, and as confirmed by a one-way 
ANOVA, children in the Sorting group were more 
likely to sort by color at some point (M = 1.30, SD 
= .86) than were children in the control groups 
(Baseline M = .65, SD = .67; Presort M = .70, SD 
= .73; Presort + Manipulation M = .80, SD = .83), 
F (3,76) = 2.93, p = .04, hp2 = .10. The follow-up 
SNK test showed that the Sorting group was 
significantly more likely to sort by color than the 
controls and that there was no significant 
difference between the control groups. The 
distribution of color-sort scores is shown in Table  
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2. In the Sorting group, 55% of the children (11 of 
20) sorted both sets of objects by color during 
their interaction with them, whereas only 17% (10 
of 60) did so in the controls, p < .001, Fisher’s 
exact test, Cramer’s V = .38. 
These data show that the spontaneous rate of 
sorting by color was low in the control groups. In 
fact, children in the Baseline control group had a 
spontaneous preference to sort by shape, which is 
consistent with previous literature. Moreover, the 
control groups demonstrate that children did not 
sort by color after seeing the objects presorted by 
color (Presort control) or after the model drew 
attention to the sorted objects and handled them in 
their respective bowls (Presort + Manipulation 
control). The uniquely high level of color sorting 
in the Sorting group suggests that witnessing the 
model’s sorting behavior led the children to sort 
by color. 
Recall that children in the Sorting group saw 
the adult sort the eight objects in Set A, but they 
did not see her sort the eight objects in Set B. The 
objects of Set B were simply put in a heap on the 
table and the children allowed to play with them 
thus providing an opportunity to test whether they 
would generalize a color-sorting strategy. A 2-way 
mixed model ANOVA on the color-sort scores 
showed no main effect difference between the 
scores on Set A (M = .48, SD = .50) and Set B (M 
= .39, SD = .49), F (1, 76) = 1.80, p = .18, hp2 = 
.02. There was a significant main effect for Test 
Group, as expected, and no significant Set(2) x 
Test Group(4) interaction (the values for Set A and 
B respectively are: Sorting M = .70, SD = .47, M = 
.60, SD = .50; Baseline M = .30, SD = .47, M = 
.35, SD = .49; Presort M = .45, SD = .51, M = .25, 
SD = .44; Presort + Manipulation M = .45, SD = 
.51, M = .35, SD = .48), F (3, 76) = .627, p = .60, 
hp2 = .02. This indicates that children were as 
likely to discriminately sort the objects by color as 
a function of test group when using Set B as they 
were when using Set A. Further, a specific 
examination of the color-sort score of Set B shows 
that the children in the Sorting group (M = .60, SD 
= .50) had a significantly higher score than did the 
children in the combined control groups (M = .32, 
SD = .47), t(76) = 2.30, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .58. 
The children in the Sorting group thus transferred 
the color sorting strategy to the objects of Set B 
even though this strategy was only demonstrated 
for the objects of Set A, showing generalization. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2: INVISIBLE PROPERTY 
 
Experiment 2 investigated whether children 
would adopt a strategy that involved sorting along 
an invisible dimension—namely, the sound the 
objects made when they were shaken. Children in 
the Sorting group watched as a model sorted four 
identical-looking objects into two categories based 
on the sound that each one made when the 
Experimenter shook them (e.g., either a jingle or a 
rattle). As in Experiment 1, we gave the children 
an opportunity to interact with that set of objects 
as well as with a second set. Since the objects in a 
given set were identical in appearance, the 
children could either sort by the invisible property 
(that could only be revealed by first shaking the 
objects to reveal the sound) or they could group 
them randomly. Because pilot testing showed that 
sorting by sound was a difficult task for 36-month-
olds, we reduced the number of objects to four 
(two of each kind). Based on the results of 
Experiment 1, we predicted that the children 
would be more likely to sort the objects by sound 
in the Sorting group versus the control groups. 
 
Method  
 
Participants. Forty-eight 36-month-olds 
(range: 2;11-3;1 years; 24 males) were recruited 
through a University’s participant list. The racial 
make-up of this sample was 87% white, 2% Asian, 
4% mixed race, and 8% unknown, with 4% 
additionally reporting Hispanic ethnicity. Three 
additional children’s data were excluded due to 
experimenter error (1) and noise during the testing 
session (2). None of the children had participated 
in Experiment 1. 
Materials. This procedure used two sets of 
four objects each. The appearance of the objects in 
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each set was identical. Unbeknownst to the child, 
the objects were hollow and filled with different 
sound-making material. One set of four objects 
consisted of four small, white hats (5.5 x 5 x 2 
cm). We inserted a rattle made of a few grains of 
hard rice kernels into two of them and inserted a 
small jingle bell into the other two. The weights of 
the objects were indistinguishable to an untrained 
adult—each filler weighing fractions of an ounce. 
An informal sample of untrained adults reported 
that the jingle and rattle sounds were readily 
distinguishable. The other set of four object 
consisted of four yellow ducks (5.5 x 4.5 x 5 cm), 
two of which contained coins and two of which 
contained packets of salt. Again, the sound-
making properties were readily discriminable but 
the weight was indistinguishable.  
Procedure. Each child was randomly assigned 
to one of three independent groups: Sorting, 
Sound-Only, or Presort + Manipulation. (The 
Presort control group used in Experiment 1 could 
not be conducted because the experimenter had to 
handle the objects in order for children to hear that 
they made distinct sounds.) Each condition 
consisted of a demonstration phase and a response 
period. 
Demonstration Phase. 
Sorting. The experimenter placed the four 
objects of Set A in a square arrangement 
(approximately 12 x 12 cm) on the table in front of 
the children, see Figure 1B (right half). Although 
the children did not know it, the two objects that 
made one kind of sound (e.g. the two hats 
containing rice) were on their right side and the 
two objects that made the other sound were on 
their left. The two bowls were placed on the table 
slightly farther away from the children than the 
objects. The adult drew the children’s attention 
(e.g. “It’s my turn first”) and proceeded to sort the 
objects into the bowls according to the sound they 
made when shaken. The experimenter always 
started with the same object (the one on the right 
of the square that was closest to the child). She 
picked it up, shook it, and listened intently, and 
then placed it into the bowl on the child’s right. 
She then picked up and shook the second object, 
which made the same sound, and placed it into the 
right bowl. Finally, she shook each of the other 
objects, one at a time, while listening intently to 
each, and placed them into the left bowl. 
Sound-Only control. The procedure for this 
control group was virtually identical to the Sorting 
group, except that there was no sorting. The 
experimenter brought out Set A, placed the four 
objects in a square on the table, and drew the 
children’s attention to them (e.g. “It’s my turn 
first.”). The experimenter then shook each of the 
objects in the same order described for the Sorting 
group. Instead of sorting the objects into the 
bowls, the experimenter simply returned the 
objects to the same place on the table. This 
provided a measure of spontaneous (baseline) 
sorting behavior based on witnessing the adult 
shaking the objects and producing two different 
sounds. 
Presort + Manipulation control. In this 
control group, children saw the final endstate of 
the sorting behavior, but not the intentional sorting 
by the adult. The experimenter brought out the 
objects of Set A, presorted in the bowls (the two 
objects with one sound property were in the right 
bowl and the two with the other sound property 
were in the left bowl). The adult then drew the 
children’s attention to them (e.g. “It’s my turn 
first.”) and picked up and shook each of the 
objects in the right bowl, one at a time, putting 
them back in their bowl. She then repeated this 
shaking and sound making with the objects in the 
left bowl. This group was highly matched to the 
Sorting group: The children saw the adult shake 
the objects, heard that two of the objects produced 
one kind of sound and two produced another kind 
of sound, and saw the adult put the objects in the 
bowls according to the sound properties. The 
experimental question is whether this was 
sufficient for children to subsequently sort by the 
property of sound, or whether they had to witness 
the adult’s active sorting behavior.  
Response Period. For all groups, the 
experimenter then placed the objects of Set A in a 
square arrangement on the table in front of the 
children (see Fig. 1B). Although the children did 
not know it, the individual objects were placed in a 
different orientation during the response period 
than they had been during the demonstration. The 
two objects that made the first type of sound were 
placed at the front of the square (in the row closest 
to the children) and the two objects that made the 
other sound were placed in the back row. This 
prevented children from achieving the correct 
categorization through an imitation strategy of 
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copying a remembered sequence of motor 
behaviors by the Experimenter. The bowl was 
placed behind the objects, but still within reaching 
distance for the children.  
The children were then given an opportunity 
to place the objects into the bowls (e.g., “Now it’s 
your turn to play with these”). Once the children 
had placed all of the objects into the bowls, the 
experimenter removed them from the table and, 
out of view of the child, put them aside so that the 
child’s sorting could be scored later. (A second 
group of Set-A objects was used because it was 
not always possible to code from the video 
whether the children had sorted the identical-
appearing objects by sounds. At the end of the 
session, the experimenter retrieved the bowls and 
determined whether the objects had been sorted by 
sound. This procedure allowed us to obtain two 
trials worth of data with identical arrays.) The 
identical group of Set-A objects was brought out 
and placed on the table in the same square 
arrangement used for the first trial, and the 
children were given a second opportunity to sort 
the objects into a new two-bowled tray (“Here, 
you can have another turn.”). When all four 
objects were sorted into the bowls, the 
experimenter removed them.  
Next the experimenter placed the objects from 
Set B on the table in a square arrangement such 
that the objects with matching sounds were in the 
front and back of the square configuration. No 
demonstration was provided for the objects of Set 
B. The children were simply invited children to 
play with them. Once the children placed all four 
of the objects into the bowls, the experimenter 
gave them another opportunity with an identical 
set of objects and bowls. As with the Set-A 
objects, each child in Experiment 2 had two 
chances to place the Set-B objects into the bowls. 
The set of objects presented as Set A was 
counterbalanced across subjects as was the sound 
that was placed on the right during the 
demonstration. 
Dependent Measure and Scoring. Children 
received a score of 1 if they placed the two objects 
that produced the same sound in one bowl and the 
two that made the other sound in the other bowl. 
Because children were given four such trials (two 
of Set A and two of Set B), scores ranged from 0 – 
4 for sorts by sound.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
When given the opportunity to handle the 
objects, almost all of the children (90%) shook all 
four objects on at least one of the four trials. The 
mean number of objects shaken per trial was 3.20 
(SD = 1.16) in the Sorting group, 3.22 (SD = 1.17) 
in the Presort + Manipulation control, and 2.53 
(SD = 1.41), in the Sound-Only control. A one-
way ANOVA showed no significant difference 
among groups, F (2, 45) = 1.57, p = .22, hp2 = .07 
indicating that the children across the groups 
shook and heard the sounds approximately equally 
during the response period. 
Figure 4 shows the mean number of trials 
sorted by sound as a function of experimental 
group. A one-way ANOVA yielded a significant 
difference in sorting as a function of group, F (2, 
45) = 5.49, p = .007, hp2 = .20. Follow-up tests 
(SNK) showed that the children in the Sorting 
group sorted by sound significantly more often (M 
= 2.44, SD = 1.45) than did the children in the 
Sound-only control (M = 1.13, SD = .81) or in the 
Presort + Manipulation control (M = 1.43, SD = 
1.15) groups, and that there was no significant 
difference between the two control groups.  
Table 3 shows the number of children who 
produced sorts based on sound. In the Sorting 
group, 38% of the children (6 of 16) sorted by 
sound on all four trials, whereas none of the 32 
children in the control groups did so, p = .001, 
Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .54. The  
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significantly higher level of sorting by sound in 
the Sorting group suggests that the children 
learned this rule from observing the model. As in 
Experiment 1, the children gleaned important 
information from observing the rule-governed 
sorting behavior itself, and applied it to both Set A 
and Set B (hence the sorting on all four trials). 
Recall that children in the Sorting group 
witnessed the adult sorting the objects by sound 
for Set A, but not for Set B. Set B was simply 
placed on the table to see what the child would do, 
testing for generalization. A 2-way mixed model 
ANOVA on the sound-sort scores showed no main 
effect difference between Set A and Set B; both 
sets had identical sorting scores (M = .83, SD = 
.81). There was a significant main effect for Test 
Group, as expected, and importantly, no 
significant Set(2) x Test Group(3) interaction, F 
(2, 45) = 1.22, p = .30, hp2 = .05 (the values for Set 
A and B respectively are: Sorting M = 1.38, SD = 
.89, M = 1.06, SD = .93; Sound-only control M = 
.50, SD = .52, M = .63, SD = .72; Presort + 
Manipulation control M = .63, SD = .72, M = .81, 
SD = .75). In short, children performed as well in 
discriminately sorting the objects as a function of 
test group using Set B as they did when using Set 
A, suggesting generalization. 
 
General Discussion 
 
The results of this work demonstrate that 
children profit from an adult’s demonstration of a 
sorting strategy. In both experiments, the children 
showed increased sorting by the target dimension 
in the Sorting group versus the controls. It is 
noteworthy that in the response period, the objects 
were placed in a random (Experiment 1) or 
predetermined (Experiment 2) arrangement that 
was different from the arrangement used during 
the model’s demonstration. Thus, to sort along the 
modeled dimension the children could not imitate 
the particular actions or the strict sequence of 
picking up and placing that the adult used. The 
children had to abstract the model’s organizational 
strategy or sorting rule and apply it to their own 
sorting behavior. 
What did the children in the Sorting groups of 
Experiments 1 and 2 learn from watching the 
adult’s demonstration? One possibility is that the 
demonstration highlighted that the fact that the 
objects had the target properties. That is, the 
demonstration may have simply shown children 
that the objects varied by color (Experiment 1) or 
sound (Experiment 2). However, this attention 
explanation taken alone seems unlikely. In 
Experiment 1, children in all conditions could see 
that the objects varied in color, and in Experiment 
2, they were equally likely to shake the objects to 
produce the sounds.  
A second possibility is that the model’s 
demonstration in the Sorting condition primed 
children to sort the objects by color or sound. In a 
case attributed to priming in the observational 
learning literature (Byrne & Russon, 1998), a 
learner observes an actor engage in certain 
behaviors and receive a reward. This observation 
activates the learner’s previously acquired habit or 
representation of what can be done with the 
elements in that situation, making these 
highlighted behaviors more likely to occur in the 
learner’s subsequent interactions with the 
materials. We think that this process is an unlikely 
explanation for our results for several reasons. 
First, it is improbable that the children had prior 
representations for how to interact with our 
stimuli, particularly for the objects we constructed 
for Experiment 2: Four identical hats that looked 
the same in every respect but nonetheless 
produced two different sounds. Second, grouping 
the objects by color or sound did not lead to any 
explicit, extrinsic reward; the model’s behaviors 
did not lead to another end, such as obtaining food 
or opening a container to get a sticker. Even the 
feedback given to the children during the response 
periods was neutral (e.g. “You can have another 
turn.”).  
Additionally, observing the outcome/endstate 
did not lead the children in the control groups to 
sort by color or sound (Presort control of 
Experiment 1; Presort + Manipulation controls, 
Experiments 1 and 2). The fact that the children in 
the Presort + Manipulation group in both 
experiments showed low levels of sorting by the 
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target dimensions is particularly striking. The 
modeled behaviors were very similar in this 
control group and in the Sorting group. In both 
cases, the adult picked up each object and placed it 
into the appropriate bowl, which resulted in two 
groups that were sorted by the target dimension. 
The key difference, however, was that in the 
Sorting groups, children saw the adult demonstrate 
a particular transformation. That is, she moved the 
objects from a mixed pile on the table via an 
intentional act of sorting. In the Presort + 
Manipulation control, in contrast, she simply 
picked them up and returned them to the presorted 
configuration in the bowls. The significant 
difference in the children’s sorting between these 
two groups indicates the key importance of the 
model’s demonstration of intentional sorting 
behavior for the acquisition of the sorting rule. 
A third explanation for our results is that 
children interpreted the adult’s demonstration as a 
social prompt or request for them to engage in the 
same sorting strategy that the adult had used. 
Children’s sensitivity to social cues in learning 
situations is well documented. Mutual eye gaze 
and the use of motherese, and stressed acts may 
identify a social or a pedagogical context to 
children that prompts them to replicate adult 
behavior (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2006). Although 
this social context may have motivated children, it 
cannot provide a full account of the effect. The 
Presort + Manipulation demonstrations 
(Experiments 1 and 2) these same features of a 
pedagogical exchange, including direct 
instructions to attend to the behaviors (i.e. “It’s my 
turn now, watch.”) and overt manipulation of the 
target objects; however, the children in these 
control groups did not produce the sorted outcome. 
Although attention, priming, and social 
support/demands may play some role, the 
explanation we favor is that children in the Sorting 
conditions learned something more fundamental 
from watching the model’s demonstration. We 
suggest that the children in the Sorting conditions 
learned to identify the new organization (e.g., 
objects were sorted by sound-making properties) 
and/or how to produce a sort by the target 
dimension (e.g., separating exemplars of the same 
shape to group them by the invisible kind of 
sound). Every object has many characteristics; it is 
not always obvious which one is relevant in a 
situation (Quine, 1960). Details such as an object’s 
color (a visual feature) and the kind of sound it 
makes when shaken (a functional property) can be 
indicative of other underlying properties. For 
example, the color of a fruit can indicate whether 
it is ripe or poisonous, and the sound that an object 
makes can indicate its invisible contents or kind 
(type of biological species).  
A number of experiments, including those 
using the dimensional change card sorting task 
(e.g., Frye, Zelazo, Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, Carlson, 
& Kesek, 2008), show that preschoolers and early-
elementary age children have difficulties 
switching between multiple properties for objects 
and that performance on early sorting tasks 
predicts scores on later general intelligence 
measures (Arlin, 1981; Bigler & Liben, 1992). The 
results of the current experiments suggest that 
observing an adult’s sorting behavior is a direct 
and efficient way to instruct children to group 
objects by different properties than they would do 
spontaneously.1 Such demonstrations may be one 
way in which social interaction and the 
observations of experts in the culture help shape 
children’s categories, which in turn may influence 
cognitive development more generally (Meltzoff 
et al., in press). 
The current research significantly expands 
studies of preschoolers’ imitation. In addition to 
the reproduction of precise actions and/or 
outcomes, our results suggest that children can 
also learn a rule or strategy through the 
observation of another’s behavior. The children in 
our experiments were shown to identify and apply 
the same categorization strategy that an adult 
demonstrated. Critically, the children’s sorting 
behavior depended on observing a model produce 
the rule to be replicated. Other physically-similar 
demonstrations were not effective for generating 
the relevant sorting. The range of control groups 
used here is one step towards isolating the 
essential components of the model’s 
demonstration and thereby specifying the 
cognitive strategies that 36-month-olds can 
abstract from observation. We are currently 
conducting additional experiments with 18-month-
olds to examine the development of imitation of 
abstract rules (Pinkham, Williamson, Jaswal, & 
Meltzoff, 2008). This expansion of research on 
childhood imitation to include rules and strategies, 
not simply concrete behaviors and endstates, 
deepens our understanding of children’s social 
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learning processes; it contributes to our 
understanding of how the children’s observation of 
adults can sculpt human cultural practices, 
thinking, and development. 
 
References 
 
Arlin, P. K. (1981). Piagetian tasks as predictors of 
reading and math readiness in grades K-1. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 73, 712-721. 
Barr, R., Dowden, A., & Hayne, H. (1996). 
Developmental changes in deferred imitation by 6- to 
24-month-old infants. Infant Behavior & Development, 
19, 159-170. 
Barr, R. & Hayne, H. (1996). The effect of event 
structure on imitation in infancy: Practice makes 
perfect? Infant Behavior & Development, 19, 253-257. 
Bauer, P. J. (1992). Holding it all together: How 
enabling relations facilitate young children’s event 
recall. Cognitive Development, 7, 1-28. 
Bauer, P. J. & Mandler, J. M. (1989). One thing 
follows another: Effects of temporal structure on 1- to 
2-year-olds’ recall of events. Developmental 
Psychology, 25, 197-206. 
Bekkering, H., Wohlschläger, A., & Gattis, M. 
(2000). Imitation of gestures in children is goal-
directed. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 53A, 153-164. 
Bigler, R. S. & Liben, L. S. (1992). Cognitive 
mechanisms in children’s gender stereotyping: 
Theoretical and educational implications of a cognitive-
based intervention. Child Development, 63, 1351-1363. 
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1996). Why culture is 
common, but cultural evolution is rare. Proceedings of 
the British Academy, 88, 73–93.  
Brace, J. J., Morton, J. B., & Munakata, Y. 
(2006). When actions speak louder than words: 
Improving children's flexibility in a card-sorting 
task. Psychological Science, 17, 665-669. 
Brian, C. R. & Goodenough, F. L. (1929). The 
relative potency of color and form perception at various 
ages. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 197–
213. 
Brugger, A., Lariviere, L. A., Mumme, D. L., & 
Bushnell, E. W. (2007). Doing the right thing: Infants’ 
selection of actions to imitate from observed event 
sequences. Child Development, 78, 806-824. 
Byrne, R. W. & Russon, A. E. (1998). Learning by 
imitation: A hierarchical approach. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 21, 667-684. 
Carpenter, M., Akhtar, N. & Tomasello, M. (1998). 
Fourteen- through 18-month-old infants differentially 
imitate intentional and accidental actions. Infant 
Behavior & Development, 21, 315-330. 
Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2002). 
Understanding “prior intentions” enables two-year-olds 
to imitatively learn a complex task. Child Development, 
73, 1431-1441. 
Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2005). 
Twelve- and 18-month-olds copy actions in terms of 
goals. Developmental Science, 8, F13-F20. 
Casler, K. & Kelemen, D. (2005). Young 
children’s rapid learning about artifacts. Developmental 
Science, 8, 472 – 480. 
Casler, K. & Kelemen, D. (2007). Reasoning about 
artifacts at 24 months: The developing teleo-functional 
stance. Cognition, 103, 120-130. 
Csibra, G. & Gergely, G. (2006). Social learning 
and social cognition: The case for pedagogy. In Y. 
Munakata &. M. H. Johnson (Eds.), Processes of 
change in brain and cognitive development. Attention 
and performance XXI (pp. 249–274). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
DiYanni, C., & Kelemen, D. (2008). Using a bad 
tool with good intention: Young children's imitation of 
adults' questionable choices. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 101, 241-261. 
Flynn, E. and Whiten, A. (2008). Cultural 
transmission of tool use in young children: A diffusion 
chain study. Social Development, 17, 699-718. 
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Palfai, T. (1995). Theory 
of mind and rule-based reasoning. Cognitive 
Development, 10, 483-527. 
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). 
Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature, 415, 
755.  
Gleissner, B., Meltzoff, A. N., & Bekkering, H. 
(2000). Children’s coding of human action: Cognitive 
factors influencing imitation in 3-year-olds. 
Developmental Science, 3, 405-414. 
Horner, V. & Whiten, A. (2005). Causal 
knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo 
sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8, 164-181. 
Kagan, J. & Lemkin, J. (1961). Form, color, and 
size in children’s conceptual behavior. Child 
Development, 32, 25-28. 
Lyons, D. E., Young, A. G., & Keil, F. C. (2007). 
The hidden structure of overimitation. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 104, 19751–19756. 
McGuigan, N., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & Horner, V. 
(2007). Imitation of causally opaque versus causally 
transparent tool use by 3- and 5-year-old children. 
Cognitive Development, 22, 353-364. 
Melkman, R., Koriat, A., & Pardo, K. (1976). 
Preference for color and form in preschoolers as related 
to color and form differentiation. Child Development, 
47, 1045-1050. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1988). Infant imitation after a 1-
week delay: Long-term memory for novel acts and 
WILLIAMSON, JASWAL, & MELTZOFF 13 
multiple stimuli. Developmental Psychology, 24, 470-
476. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the 
intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 
18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 
838-850. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2007). The ‘like me’ framework 
for recognizing and becoming an intentional agent. Acta 
Psychologica, 124, 26–43. 
Meltzoff, A. N. & Gopnik, A. (1993). The role of 
imitation in understanding persons and developing a 
theory of mind. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, 
& D. J. Cohen (Eds.), Understanding other minds: 
Perspectives from autism (pp. 335-366). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Meltzoff, A. N., Kuhl, P. K., Movellan, J. & 
Sejnowski, T. J. (In press). Foundations for a new 
science of learning. Science. 
Moriguchi, Y., Lee, K., & Itakura, S. (2007). 
Social transmission of disinhibition in young children. 
Developmental Science, 10, 481–491.  
Nagell, K., Olguin, R. S. & Tomasello, M. (1993). 
Processes of social learning in the tool use of 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children 
(Homo sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 
107, 174-186. 
Nielsen, M. (2006). Copying actions and copying 
outcomes: Social learning through the second year. 
Developmental Psychology, 42, 555-565. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Repacholi, B. M., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2007). 
Emotional eavesdropping: Infants selectively respond 
to indirect emotional signals. Child Development, 78, 
503-521. 
Rogers, S. J., & Williams, J. H. G. (Eds.). (2006). 
Imitation and the social mind: Autism and typical 
development. New York: Guilford. 
Smith, K., Kalish, M. L., Griffiths, T. L., & 
Lewandowsky, S. (2008). Cultural transmission and the 
evolution of human behaviour. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society: Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 363, 3469-3476. 
Subiaul, F., Cantlon, J. F., Holloway, R. L., and 
Terrace, H. S. (2004). Cognitive imitation in rhesus 
macaques. Science, 305, 407-410. 
Subiaul, F., Lurie, H., Romansky, K., Klein, T., 
Holmes, D., & Terrace, H. (2007). Cognitive imitation 
in typically-developing 3- and 4-year olds and 
individuals with autism. Cognitive Development, 22, 
230-243. 
Subiaul, F., Romansky, K., Cantlon, J. F., Klein, 
T., & Terrace, H. (2007). Cognitive imitation in 2-year 
old human children (Homo sapiens): A comparison 
with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Animal 
Cognition, 10, 369-75. 
Suchman, R. G. & Trabasso, T. (1966). Color and 
form preference in young children. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 3, 177-187. 
Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Push 
or pull: Imitation vs. emulation in great apes and human 
children. Ethology, 112, 1159-1169. 
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of 
human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Want, S. C. & Harris, P. L. (2001). Learning from 
other people’s mistakes: Causal understanding in 
learning to use a tool. Child Development, 72, 431-443. 
Want, S. C. & Harris, P. L. (2002). How do 
children ape? Applying concepts from the study of non-
human primates to the developmental study of 
‘imitation’ in children. Developmental Science, 5, 1-13. 
Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J.-C., 
Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative learning 
of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) 
and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 110, 3-14. 
Whiten, A., Flynn, E., Brown, K, & Lee, T. (2006). 
Imitation of hierarchical action structure by young 
children. Developmental Science, 9, 574-582. 
Williamson, R. A., & Markman, E. M. (2006). 
Precision of imitation as a function of preschoolers’ 
understanding of the goal of the demonstration. 
Developmental Psychology, 42, 723-731. 
Williamson, R. A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Markman, 
E. M. (2008). Prior experiences and perceived efficacy 
influence 3-year-olds’ imitation. Developmental 
Psychology, 44, 275-285. 
Zelazo, P. D., Carlson, S. M., & Kesek, A. (2008). 
The development of executive function in childhood. In 
C. Nelson & M. Luciana (Eds), Handbook of 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience (2nd Ed.) (pp. 
553-574). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
